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Abstract
Although mind-wandering research is rapidly progressing, stark disagreements are emerging
about what the term “mind-wandering” means. Four prominent views define mind-wandering as
(a) task-unrelated thought, (b) stimulus-independent thought, (c) unintentional thought, or (d)
dynamically unguided thought. Although theorists claim to capture the ordinary understanding of
mind-wandering, no systematic studies have assessed these claims. Two large factorial studies pre-
sent participants (N = 545) with vignettes that describe someone’s thoughts and ask whether her
mind was wandering, while systematically manipulating features relevant to the four major
accounts of mind-wandering. Dynamics explains between four and 40 times more variance in par-
ticipants’ mind-wandering judgments than other features. Our third study (N = 153) tests and sup-
ports a unique prediction of the dynamic framework—obsessive rumination contrasts with mind-
wandering. Our final study (N = 277) used vignettes that resemble mind-wandering experiments.
Dynamics had significant and large effects, while task-unrelatedness was nonsignificant. These
results strongly suggest that the central feature of mind-wandering is its dynamics.
Keywords: Mind-wandering; Daydreaming; Experimental philosophy; Conceptual analysis; Folk
psychology; Task-unrelated thought; Spontaneous thought
1. Introduction
Mind-wandering science has expanded so rapidly that researchers dubbed this “the era
of the wandering mind” (Callard, Smallwood, Golchert, & Margulies, 2013). Yet stark
disagreements are emerging within philosophy and cognitive science about what the term
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“mind-wandering” means. Until recently, leading researchers defined mind-wandering as
task-unrelated thought—thought disengaged from one’s primary task—and/or stimulus-in-
dependent thought—thought decoupled from perception (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006,
2015).
Researchers recently questioned this standard approach because it lumps together dis-
parate phenomena (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-Hanna, 2016; Irving, 2016;
Irving & Thompson, 2018; Mills, Raffaelli, Irving, Stan, & Christoff, 2017; Seli, Kane,
Smallwood, et al., 2018). Consider the diverse experiences a student may have when she
disengages from lecture. Her mind might wander from a show she has been watching, to
a party next weekend, to a joke she heard yesterday. Or she might reason through a math
proof in her head. The standard approach classifies both experiences as mind-wandering,
since the student’s thoughts are about neither lecture nor perception (and thus are task
unrelated and stimulus independent). But solving a proof seems antithetical to mind-wan-
dering.
These challenges have generated disagreement about what “mind-wandering” means.
Four views loom large. We have seen two, on which mind-wandering is task-unrelated or
stimulus-independent thought. The third classifies mind-wandering as unintentional
thought: thought that arises independent of conscious intentions (McVay & Kane, 2010;
Watzl, 2017).1 On the fourth, mind-wandering is dynamically unguided thought. On the
dynamic view, mind-wandering is not guided to remain in place, so it meanders from
topic to topic over time (Christoff et al., 2016; Irving, 2016; Irving & Thompson, 2018;
Mills et al., 2017; cf. Sripada, 2016, 2018).
This disagreement is partly empirical: Which theory best explains existing psychologi-
cal and neuroscientific findings and which will best generate future research? However,
“mind-wandering” is also a folk term that researchers introduced to capture a “phe-
nomenon . . . familiar to the lay person” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). This raises a
question: What does “mind-wandering” mean to ordinary people? This question has not
been systematically investigated and is important for two reasons. First, almost all mind-
wandering research relies on an introspective method called “thought sampling” (Irving,
2018; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). If researchers are correct and “mind-wandering”
tracks introspective experiences, everyday intuitions may suggest distinctions and general-
izations that are scientifically relevant. Second, we can avoid confusions in scientific
communication by using terms that track common usage. For example, claims about the
prevalence and function of mind-wandering may be misinterpreted if scientific and every-
day conceptions of mind-wandering are incongruent.
In two large factorial studies, we present participants (N = 722) with vignettes that
describe someone’s thoughts and systematically manipulate features relevant to the four
major accounts of mind-wandering. We find that dynamic guidance explains between four
and 40 times more variance in participants’ mind-wandering judgments than other fea-
tures. Our third study (N = 153) uses vignettes to test a unique prediction of the dynamic
framework—that obsessive, ruminative thought contrasts with mind-wandering, even
though it is both task and stimulus independent. We find support for this prediction. Our
final study (N = 277) used vignettes that resemble the conditions in experimental mind-
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wandering research. Dynamics had significant and large effects in this study, while task-
unrelatedness was not significant. Our results strongly align with the dynamic theory (as
well as a particular kind of family resemblance theory, one in which dynamics are the
central feature of mind-wandering; see Section 7).
2. Study 1: Experimental manipulation of task-relatedness, intentionality, and
dynamic guidance
Study 1 tested whether folk judgments align with theories of mind-wandering as off-
task thought, unintentional thought, or dynamically unguided thought. To do so, we con-
trasted vignettes that had the same thought contents, but varied with respect to whether
they were on-task or off-task, intentional or unintentional, and guided to a single topic or
meandering unguided from one topic to another.
2.1. Methods
A priori sample-size calculations with the software G*power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007) indicated that we required at least 341 participants, given a power of
0.95 and effect sizes of at least g2 = 0.027 in a pilot study. For an equal number of par-
ticipants in our 24 groups, we therefore requested 360 participants from Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk (MTurk). Three hundred and sixty-four participants (Gender: 210 men, 153
women, 1 others; Median age group: 24–35; Median education: some college or bache-
lor’s) were eventually recruited because three participants completed the experiment with-
out reporting to MTurk.
In a between-subjects factorial design, each subject read a single vignette in which a
character named Susan has three thoughts.2 Participants were then asked “How much do
you agree with the following statement: Susan’s mind is wandering” and answered on a
7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Eight participants were
excluded from the analysis because they failed one of the two attention checks.
Vignettes varied along three dimensions: (a) task-relatedness—off-task vs. no-task; (b)
intentionality—unintentional initiation vs. intentional initiation; and (c) dynamic guidance
—meandering vs. guided. Task-relatedness and intentionality were manipulated by alter-
ing how Susan’s thoughts are initiated (Table 1).
Vignettes also varied with respect to their dynamics (how they unfolded over time;
Table 2; Fig. 1).3 Specifically, we varied whether Susan guided her thoughts to remain
on a single topic or whether her thoughts meandered as she “did not focus on any topic
for long.” Guided vignettes contain three sentences, each of which describes a thought
about the same topic: grocery shopping, planning a camping trip, or planning a reception
for work. Meandering vignettes contain one sentence from each focused vignette, to
describe a case where Susan’s thoughts meander between three topics (groceries, camp-
ing, and a reception). This technique yielded an overall 2 9 2 9 2 9 3 design, where
focused and meandering vignettes varied in their dynamics but were matched on the
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contents of Susan’s thoughts. This allowed us to control for the potential effects of con-
tent on mind-wandering judgments, while ensuring that our results were generalizable
across topics. Instructions for how to create each vignette are included in Appendix S1.
2.2. Results
Collapsing across content domains, a three-way ANOVA (task-relatedness 9 guid-
ance 9 intention) was conducted to predict mind-wandering ratings. While all three
dimensions of thought were significant (p < .05; Fig. 2; Table 3), dynamic guidance
(g2 = 0.15) explained approximately four times more variance than task-relatedness
(g2 = 0.04) and 10 times more variance than intentionality (g2 = 0.015; Table 3;
Fig. 2).4
Visual inspection of Fig. 2 suggests a possible three-way interaction in which off-task,
unintentional thought specifically yields high mind-wandering ratings even when thought
Table 1
Manipulating task-relatedness (in bold) and intentionality (in italics). Examples of stimuli from Study 1
Off-Task No-Task
Unintentional Initiation8 Susan is supposed to be doing
her homework when she finds
herself thinking about
something else. . .
Susan is lounging around, not doing
anything in particular, when she
finds herself thinking about
something else. . .
Intentional Initiation Susan is supposed to be doing
her homework when she
intentionally decides to think
about something else. . .
Susan is lounging around, not doing
anything in particular, when she
intentionally decides to think about
something else. . .
Table 2
Examples of guided and unguided vignettes from Study 1. Guided vignettes describe three thoughts about the
same topic (in green), whereas unguided vignettes describe thoughts about three different topics (in green,
blue, and orange). Guided and unguided vignettes also contain different sentences describing the dynamics of
thought (in bold)
Dynamically Guided Dynamically Unguided
Susan is supposed to be doing her homework when she
finds herself thinking about the groceries she needs
this week. She remembers some items from her grocery
list—“eggs, bread, milk, apples”. . . She thinks about
what meals she wants to cook this week and what
ingredients she will need. Then she imagines walking
through the grocery store aisles later today and thinks
about what she would like to buy. Susan is trying to
focus on the groceries she needs and if she gets
distracted, she makes sure to return to this topic.
Susan is supposed to be doing her homework
when she finds herself thinking about other
things. She remembers some items from her
grocery list—“eggs, bread, milk, apples”. . .
Then she thinks about how to decorate a
reception hall for her student group. Then she
imagines the route she will drive to the camp-
grounds on her upcoming camping trip. Susan
does not focus on any of these thoughts for
long, and when she switches topics she simply
moves on.
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dynamics are guided. However, the three-way interaction did not reach statistical signifi-
cance (p = .314), indicating that the right-most gray bar does not statistically differ when
compared to the other three gray bars. The task-relatedness by intentionality interaction
was significant (p < .033), indicating that being off-task boosted mind-wandering ratings

























Fig. 1. How guided vignettes were recombined to create unguided vignettes. During “guided” vignettes, the
character has three thoughts that are focused on a single topic (top row). During unguided thinking, the char-
acter has three thoughts that meander between different topics (bottom row). To avoid content effects, the
unguided vignettes recombined sentences drawn from the guided vignettes.
Fig. 2. Mind-wandering ratings by dynamic guidance, task-relatedness, and intentionality. Subjects were pre-
sented with vignettes that manipulated three factors relevant to three leading theories of mind-wandering.
Dynamic guidance was a strong predictor of mind-wandering ratings with unguided thinking (red bar) earning
higher mind-wandering ratings than guided thinking across all conditions. Error bars represent standard errors.
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effect = 1.11) than the intentional initiation condition (mean task-relatedness
effect = 0.27). The task-relatedness by dynamics interaction was also significant
(p < .004), indicating being off task had a modestly larger effect on mind-wandering rat-
ings when thought was guided (mean task-relatedness effect = 1.26) versus unguided
(mean task-relatedness effect = 0.25). No other interactions were significant.
Descriptive statistics for all studies are available in Appendix S1.
3. Study 2: Manipulation of stimulus-independence and dynamic guidance
Study 2 used the matched vignettes method to test an additional potential dimension of
mind-wandering, exploring whether stimulus-independence or dynamic guidance best pre-
dicts mind-wandering judgments. To do so, we used new vignettes where Susan could
consider the same topic (e.g., packing for a trip) by either thinking about (stimulus inde-
pendent) or looking at (stimulus dependent) objects in her home.5
3.1. Methods
A new group of 182 participants were recruited through Amazon’s MTurk (Gender: 98
men, 82 women, 2 others; Median age group: 24–35; Median education: some college or
bachelor’s). As in Study 1, we requested 15 participants per group. Five participants were
excluded from the analysis because they failed one of two attention checks.
Each participant rated a vignette describing Susan’s experiences, as in Study 1. Vign-
ettes varied along two dimensions: dynamic guidance and stimulus-dependence. In all
vignettes, Susan was performing no task and her mind began to wander unintentionally.
Vignettes were about three new topics to ensure that our results generalized across con-
tent domains.
Stimulus-dependence was manipulated by varying whether Susan thought about (stimu-
lus independent) or looked at (stimulus dependent) objects in her house, as illustrated in
Table 4 (left column). During focused vignettes, Susan thought about or looked at things
in order to prepare for a task (packing for a trip, cooking dinner, or painting).
The procedure from Study 1 was used to manipulate the dynamics of internal and
external vignettes, yielding a 2 9 2 9 3 design that varied dynamics and stimulus-depen-
dence, but was matched for topics.
Table 3
ANOVA to predict mind-wandering ratings using dynamics, task-relatedness, and intentionality (* = si)
Dimension F p g2
Dynamic guidance F(1, 352) = 69.66 <.001 0.15
Task-relatedness F(1, 352) = 19.89 <.001 0.04
Intentionality F(1, 352) = 6.94 .009 0.02
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3.2. Results
Collapsing across content domains, a two-way ANOVA (dynamic guidance 9 stimu-
lus-dependence) was conducted to predict mind-wandering ratings. As in Study 1, both
thought dimensions were significant (p < .05, although stimulus independence was only
marginally significant (Fig. 3; Table 5). However, guidance (g2 = 0.47) explained
approximately 40 times more variance than stimulus-independence (g2 = 0.012; Fig. 3;
Table 5). Interactions were not significant (p = .674).
4. Study 3: Manipulating rumination
Folk judgments so far cohere with the dynamic view of mind-wandering. However, we
have not assessed a unique prediction of the dynamic view concerning rumination. Rumi-
nation is “a mode of responding to distress. . . [where] people. . . remain fixated on the
Table 4
Example of how to manipulate stimulus-dependence (bold) and guidance (italics) in Study 2. Guided vign-
ettes describe three thoughts about the same topic (in green), whereas unguided vignettes describe thoughts
about three different topics (in green, blue, and orange)
Stimulus Independent Stimulus Dependent
Guided Susan is lounging around, not doing anything in
particular, when she finds herself thinking
about what she needs to pack for her
upcoming trip to Europe. She remembers her
passport, which she needs to pack in her
carry-on luggage. Then she imagines some
clothes that she needs put in her suitcase.
Then she thinks about the umbrella that she
wants to bring in case it rains. Susan is trying
to focus on what she needs to pack and if she
gets distracted, she makes sure to return to
this topic.
Susan is lounging around, not doing
anything in particular, when she finds
herself looking at what she needs to pack
for her upcoming trip to Europe. She looks
at her passport, which she needs to pack in
her carry-on luggage. Then she looks at
some clothes that she needs put in her
suitcase. Then she looks at the umbrella
that she wants to bring in case it rains.
Susan is trying to focus on what she needs
to pack and if she gets distracted, she
makes sure to return to this topic.
Unguided Susan is lounging around, not doing anything in
particular, when she finds herself thinking
about various things. She remembers her
passport, which she needs to pack in her
carry-on luggage for her upcoming trip to
Europe. Then she imagines the tomatoes that
she will cut for dinner tonight. Then she
thinks about the old paint she has to scrape
off the walls when she repaints her apartment.
Susan does not focus on any of these thoughts
for long, and when she switches topics, she
simply moves on.
Susan is lounging around, not doing
anything in particular, when she finds
herself looking at various things. She
looks at her passport, which she needs to
pack in her carry-on luggage for her
upcoming trip to Europe. Then she looks
at the tomatoes that she will cut for dinner
tonight. Then she looks at the old paint
she has to scrape off the walls when she
repaints her apartment. Susan does not
focus on any of these thoughts for long,
and when she switches topics, she simply
moves on.
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problems and on their feelings about them” (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky,
2008; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Rumination is often, indeed gener-
ally, task and stimulus independent. But the dynamic view implies that mind-wandering,
which meanders between topics, contrasts with rumination that is “stuck” on a distressing
topic (Christoff et al., 2016; Irving, 2016; Irving & Glasser, 2019). Opponents of the
dynamic view object that rumination is a type of mind-wandering (Metzinger, 2018; Seli,
Kane, Smallwood, et al., 2018). We therefore tested whether ordinary people classify
rumination as mind-wandering.
4.1. Methods
A new group of 145 participants were recruited through Amazon’s MTurk (Gender:
102 men, 41 women, 2 others; Median age: 29; Median education: some college or bach-
elor’s). As in Study 1, we requested 15 participants per group. Forty-six participants were
excluded from the analysis because they failed one of two attention checks.
Similar to Studies 1 and 2, each participant rated a vignette describing Susan’s
thoughts. As in Study 2, Susan was not performing a task and began thinking unintention-
ally. Vignettes were in one of the three conditions: dynamically unguided (meandering)
versus dynamically guided (deliberative thinking) versus ruminative. Ruminative vignettes
Fig. 3. Mind-wandering ratings by dynamic guidance and perceptual orientation. Subjects were presented
with vignettes that factorially manipulated dynamically guided versus dynamically unguided thinking and
external versus internal perceptual orientation. Mind-wandering ratings were substantially higher for unguided
thinking (red bar) irrespective of perceptual orientation. Error bars represent standard errors.
Table 5
ANOVA to predict mind-wandering ratings using dynamic guidance and stimulus-dependence
Dimension F p g2
Dynamic guidance F(1, 173) = 157.26 <.001 0.47
Stimulus-dependence F(1, 173) = 3.98 .048 0.01
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were focused on the same thoughts as deliberately guided ones but varied with respect to
whether Susan found her thoughts elicited distress (nervousness, anxiety, and worry) and
obsessive focus (Susan was “fixated” and “drawn back” to a topic during rumination).
The procedure from Studies 1 and 2 was used to manipulate dynamic guidance, yield-
ing a 3 9 3 design on which dynamically guided, dynamically unguided, and ruminative
vignettes were matched for topics (Table 6).
4.2. Results
Two-sample t tests revealed that mind-wandering judgments were significantly higher
for dynamically unguided vignettes than that for either dynamically guided vignettes t
(63) = 3.64, p < .001 or ruminative vignettes (t(60) = 3.10, p = .003). Both effects were
large, with a Cohen’s d of 0.91 and 0.79, respectively. In contrast, mind-wandering judg-
ments did not differ between dynamically guided vignettes and ruminative vignettes
(p = .849; Fig. 4).
5. Study 4: On-task thought
Study 1 manipulated task-relatedness by contrasting cases where Susan was off-task
and had no-task. We used this manipulation because the standard view arguably entails
Table 6
Examples of unguided, guided, and ruminative vignettes. Guided and ruminative vignettes contain thoughts
about one topic (in green), whereas dynamic vignettes contain thoughts about three different topics (in green,
blue, and orange). Other changes are in bold
Unguided Guided Ruminative
Susan is lounging around, not
doing anything in particular,
when she finds herself
thinking about various
things. She remembers a list
of required courses for next
year—“Math, Biology,
English.” Then she imagines
the music she will play at a
party this weekend. Then she
thinks about how to describe
her work experience in an
upcoming job interview.
Susan does not focus on any
of these thoughts for long,
and when she switches topics
she simply moves on.
Susan is lounging around, not
doing anything in particular,
when she finds herself
thinking about what classes
to take next year. She
remembers a list of her
required courses—“Math,
Biology, English.” Then she
imagines how she can fit a
biology lab into her schedule.
Then she thinks about taking
advanced physics, and whether
she can handle all the
equations. Susan is trying to
focus on what classes to
take, and if she gets
distracted, she makes sure to
return to this topic.
Susan is lounging around, not doing
anything in particular, when her
thoughts turn obsessively to what
classes to take next year. She
nervously remembers a list of her
required courses—“Math, Biology,
English.” Then she anxiously
imagines how she can fit a biology
lab into her schedule. Then she
worries about taking advanced
physics, and whether she can handle
all the equations. Susan cannot help
but fixate on what classes to take,
and she is drawn back to this topic
whenever she tries to think about
something else.
Z. C. Irving et al. / Cognitive Science 44 (2020) 9 of 20
that mind-wandering cannot occur without a task. If mind-wandering is task-unrelated
thought, the wanderer must have some task to wander away from (Irving, 2016; Seli,
Kane, Smallwood, et al., 2018). This assumption undergirds influential mind-wandering
experiments. For example, Baird et al. (2012) infer that mind-wandering aids creativity
because easy tasks (which induce task-unrelated thoughts) facilitate creativity more than
rest (i.e., no-task). Baird’s inference is valid only if off-task mind-wandering is distinct
from no-task rest. Similarly, studies of everyday mind-wandering ask participants “are
you thinking about something other than what you were doing” (Killingsworth & Gilbert,
2010) or “my mind had wandered to something other than what I was doing” (Kane
et al., 2007, emphasis added). These questions assume that mind-wandering occurs only
when participants are doing something (i.e., performing a task) that their minds wander
away from.
Laboratory mind-wandering studies, however, typically contrast off-task thought (e.g.,
Susan’s mind wanders from homework) with on-task thought (e.g., Susan focuses on
homework). Task-relatedness may therefore predict mind-wandering ratings better if we
contrast off-task and on-task thought. We tested this hypothesis in Study 4.
5.1. Methods
A new group of 260 participants were recruited through Amazon’s MTurk (Gender:
167 men, 93 women, 0 others; Median age: 36; Median education: bachelor’s degree). As
in Study 1, we requested 15 participants per group. We recruited MTurk Masters who
had above 90% reputation to ensure data quality (Peer, Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2014).
Seventeen participants were dropped because they incorrectly answered one of the two
attention checks.
Similar to Studies 1 through 4, each participant rated a vignette describing Susan’s
experiences. Vignettes varied along two dimensions (Table 7): dynamic guidance (guided
vs. unguided) and task-relatedness (off-task vs. no-task vs. on-task). Task-relatedness was
Fig. 4. Mind-wandering ratings for unguided, deliberately guided, and ruminative thought. Unguided thought
(red bar) received significantly higher ratings than either deliberatively guided or ruminative thought, which
were not significantly different from each other. Error bars represent standard errors.
10 of 20 Z. C. Irving et al. / Cognitive Science 44 (2020)
manipulated according to the procedure in Table 7. The procedure from Study 1 was used
to manipulate the dynamics of thought, yielding a 3 9 2 design that varied task-related-
ness and dynamics, but was matched for topics.
Our goal was to mirror laboratory conditions where subjects intentionally engage in
on-task thought. Subjects engage in on-task thought when they intentionally perform a
task such as pressing a button or, in our case, planning a camping trip. Given this, on-
task vignettes had to be intentionally initiated. To match vignettes across conditions, all
vignettes were therefore intentionally initiated.
Our on-task and unguided condition involved unstructured tasks. The dynamic view
predicts that certain kinds of on-task thought (e.g., brainstorming and creative thinking)
are more similar to mind-wandering than others (e.g., planning a trip; Christoff et al.,
2016; Irving, Under Revisions, 2016; Sripada, 2018). This is because tasks like brain-
storming impose little dynamic structure on the train of thought: Such tasks are so broad
that they let one’s mind wander to many topics (see Irving, 2016 for a model of unstru-
tured tasks). Our on-task and unguided condition therefore has Susan perform an unstruc-
tured task—“thinking about her plans for the next few weeks”—that lets her mind freely
wander to three different topics. Here is one such vignette, with each topic in a different
color:
• Susan intentionally decides to think about her plans for the next few weeks, when
she has the following thoughts. She makes a list of equipment that she needs for
her next camping trip—“tent, sleeping bag, pillow. . .” Then she imagines walking
through the grocery store aisles later in the week, considering what she would like
to buy. Then she thinks about how to describe her work experience at an upcoming
interview. Susan does not focus on any of these things for long, and when she
switches topics, she simply moves on.
Table 7
Procedure used to manipulate stimulus-dependence and guidance. Each guided vignette is followed by three
thoughts about the same topic (in this example, a camping trip). Each unguided vignette is followed by three
thoughts about Susan’s plans for the next few weeks (her camping trip, job interview, and groceries)
Off-Task No-Task On-Task
Guided Susan is doing her
homework when she
intentionally decides to
think about her camping
trip. . .
Susan is lounging around, not
doing anything in particular,
when she intentionally decides
to think about her camping
trip. . .
Susan intentionally decides to
think about her upcoming
camping trip, when she has
the following thoughts. . .





Susan is lounging around, not
doing anything in particular,
when she intentionally decides
to think about various things. . .
Susan intentionally decides to
think about her plans for the
next few weeks, when she
has the following thoughts. . .
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Even though Susan is on-task, the dynamic theory predicts that she should receive
higher mind-wandering ratings because her thoughts are dynamically unstructured (i.e.,
weakly guided).
5.2. Results
Collapsing across content domains, a two-way ANOVA (dynamic guidance 9 task-re-
latedness) was conducted to predict mind-wandering ratings. As in previous studies, the
effect of dynamic guidance on ratings was significant and large (F(1, 255) = 43.68,
g2 = 0.14, p < .001). Task-relatedness did not significantly predict mind-wandering rat-
ings, although there was a trend in that direction (p = .057). Visual inspection of Fig. 5
suggests a possible two-way interaction in which the effect of task-relatedness is signifi-
cant when thought is guided. However, the interaction between dynamics and task-relat-
edness was not significant (p = .440). Our results strongly speak against the hypothesis
that task-relatedness is closely linked to mind-wandering in contexts that mirror the
experimental distinction between on-task and off-task thought.
6. Study 5: Linguistic analysis of intentionality and mind-wandering
Study 1 found that intentionality weakly predicts mind-wandering, whereas many pre-
dict a stronger relationship (McVay & Kane, 2010; Watzl, 2017) or even that intentional
mind-wandering is impossible (Murray & Krasich, forthcoming). Study 5 therefore used
linguistic analysis to probe the folk’s understanding of intentionality and mind-wandering.
6.1. Methods
One way to shed light on a term’s meaning is to examine its collocates: that is, words
that are commonly juxtaposed with that term. We therefore examined collocates for terms
that refer to mind-wandering6 in two English language corpora: The Corpus of Contem-
porary American English (Davies, 2008), the largest genre-balanced corpora, and the
Intelligent Web Based Corpus (Davies, 2017), the largest online corpus where websites
were chosen in a systematic way (to ensure that they were popular among users from
English-speaking countries, for example).
6.2. Results
In both corpora, by far the most common collocate for mind-wandering terms is “let,”
as in “Susan let her mind wander on purpose” (Davies, 2008, 2017; Table 8). These con-
structions describe cases of intentional mind-wandering, where someone consents to her
mind’s wandering, rather than cases where someone’s mind wanders unintentionally. Lin-
guistic data therefore lend additional support to the view, already supported by our exper-
imental evidence, that ordinary people consider intentional mind-wandering to be a
typical form of mind-wandering (Seli, Risko, Smilek, & Schacter, 2016). However, our
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data do not show that the folk believe we can directly intend to mind-wander. Letting
one’s mind wander may involve only indirect intentional control: One might intend to
perform some intermediate action (e.g., walking) that causes one’s mind to wander. We
therefore do not resolve the philosophical debate over whether intentions to mind-wander
are direct (Irving, Under Revisions) or indirect (Murray & Krasich, forthcoming).
7. Discussion
Mind-wandering is standardly defined in two ways, namely as task-unrelated or stimu-
lus-independent thought (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). A third research program con-
trasts unintentional and intentional mind-wandering (Seli et al., 2016). A fourth approach
defines mind-wandering as dynamically unguided thought (Christoff et al., 2016; Irving,
2016; Irving & Thompson, 2018; Mills et al., 2017; Sripada, 2018).
We investigated whether these theories cohere with ordinary people’s understanding of
mind-wandering. Studies 1 and 2 found that the dynamic view explained by far the most
variance in folk mind-wandering judgments. Study 3 found that ordinary people agree
with a unique prediction of the dynamic view—obsessive rumination contrasts with
mind-wandering. Study 4 used vignettes designed to mirror experimental mind-wandering
research. Here, the effect of dynamics remained significant and large, whereas task-
Fig. 5. Mind-wandering ratings by task-relatedness and dynamics. Subjects were presented with vignettes
that factorially manipulated dynamically guidance (guided vs. unguided) and task-relatedness (on-task vs. off-
task vs. no-task). Mind-wandering ratings were significantly higher for unguided (red bars) versus guided
(gray bars) thought. Task-relatedness had no significant effect on ratings. Error bars represent standard errors.
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relatedness became nonsignificant. These studies represent the first empirical investigation
into what ordinary people mean by “mind-wandering.”
Our results are significant for several reasons. Confusions can arise when scientific ter-
minology diverges from ordinary meaning. Scientists who define “mind-wandering” as
task-unrelated, stimulus-independent, or unintentional thought may talk past their lay
audiences and colleagues, who centrally understand mind-wandering in dynamic terms.
Such cross talk may invite audiences to draw unwarranted inferences. Researchers have
drawn fascinating conclusions about task-unrelated thought. Because researchers call
task-unrelated thought “mind-wandering"; however, audiences may inappropriately gener-
alize the conclusions to dynamically unguided thought. Consider the following cases:
• Researchers routinely claim that people spend 30–50% of their waking lives
“mind-wandering” because task-unrelated thought is this pervasive (Kane et al.,
2007; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Klinger & Cox, 1987). Yet many task-unre-
lated thoughts are likely goal directed or ruminative, categories that lay people con-
trast with mind-wandering.
• Researchers hotly debated evidence that “mind-wandering” recruits the executive
network (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Fox, Spreng,
Ellamil, Andrews-Hanna, & Christoff, 2015; McVay & Kane, 2010; Smallwood,
2010; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). The executive–mind-wandering connection
may surprise audiences who endorse the dynamic/folk view, since the executive
typically supports focused, goal-directed thought (Owen, McMillan, Laird, & Bull-
more, 2005; Rottschy et al., 2012). One explanation of this connection is that the
executive supports goal-directed task-unrelated thought, not dynamically unguided
thought, which ordinary people associate with mind-wandering.
Our studies suggest that the dynamic theory of mind-wandering has an advantage: It
tracks ordinary usage. The dynamic theory also has scientific advantages (Christoff et al.,
2016; Irving, 2016; Irving & Glasser, 2019). Recall that standard theories of mind-wan-
dering bundle together disparate phenomena. When someone is “off-task,” she may mean-
der between topics, concentrate on a goal, or endlessly ruminate. These experiences have
Table 8
The five most common collocates of phrases that describe mind-wandering, excluding pronouns. Results are
from The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) and The Intelligent Web Based Corpus
(iWeb). The percentage of all phrases that include this collocate is represented in brackets
COCA iWeb
1 Let (19.0%) Let (29.4%)
2 Back (9.7%) Letting (7.4%)
3 Letting (3.5%) Gently (1.5%)
4 Lets (2.4%) Distracted (0.4%)
5 Wondered (1.4%) Refocus (0.2%)
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very different phenomenology, costs and benefits, psychological and neural mechanisms,
and so on.
In contrast, dynamically unguided thought has relatively cohesive attributes. Unguided
thought is linked to specific forms of agency (Irving, 2016) and creativity (Christoff
et al., 2016; Sripada, 2018). It is closely associated with the default network. And it is
elevated in disorders such as attention deficit disorder (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2018;
Christoff et al., 2016). If we understand mind-wandering as dynamically unguided
thought, it may prove considerably more unified, philosophically defensible, and empiri-
cally tractable.
It may be no coincidence that the commonsense theory of mind-wandering has sub-
stantive philosophical and scientific advantages. Philosophers regularly rely on common-
sense intuitions when we theorize about psychological entities such as perception,
attention, memory, imagination, emotion, or mind-wandering. Consider how philosophers
appeal to intuitions about what cases do (and do not) fall under psychological categories.
Such intuitions are ultimately grounded in one’s grasp of folk psychology, albeit filtered
through philosophical training. Our vignette-based experiments complement this armchair
case method, since experiments give us empirical evidence about the boundaries of folk-
psychological concepts. Similarly, our linguistic corpora analysis provides evidence about
how the folk speak and is therefore a rigorous alternative to ordinary language philosophy
of psychology. Our empirical conceptual analysis is thus an extension of orthodox com-
monsense methods in the philosophy of psychology. And commonsense aligns most clo-
sely with the dynamic theory of mind-wandering.
Finally, our results help to indicate which version of the “family resemblance” theory
of mind-wandering is most plausible (Christoff et al., 2018; Irving & Glasser, 2019; Met-
zinger, 2018; Seli, Kane, Smallwood, et al., 2018). Seli, Kane, Metzinger, et al. (2018)
characterize mind-wandering in terms of a cluster of (at least) four features: whether
one’s thoughts are (a) task unrelated, (b) stimulus independent, (c) unintentional, and (d)
dynamically unguided. Although prototypical instances of mind-wandering have all these
features, they argue that none are necessary.
Our results indicate that certain versions of the family resemblance framework are
more promising than others. Rosch and Mervis’ (1975) classic model of family resem-
blance concepts assumes that all relevant features are equally weighted and prototypical-
ity depends on the number of features an instance exhibits. Our data speak against this
“equal weighting” model, but they are consistent with alternative formalisms of family
resemblance concepts that allow for differences in feature salience (e.g., Gati & Tversky,
2004). Specifically, one could hold that mind-wandering is a family resemblance concept
with one central feature—its dynamics—and multiple peripheral features (task-unrelated-
ness, stimulus-independence, and unintentionality).
However, our results cannot settle the debate over whether mind-wandering is a family
resemblance concept (see Christoff et al., 2018; Seli, Kane, Smallwood, et al., 2018 for a
debate). Our study is designed only to examine the relative contributions of various fea-
tures (dynamics, task-unrelatedness, etc.) to judgments about mind-wandering. We find
that one feature (dynamics) is central, whereas the others are peripheral. But this is
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consistent with two interpretations of peripheral features. First, peripheral features may be
constitutive of the concept mind-wandering, as predicted by the family resemblance the-
ory of concepts (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Second, peripheral features may merely be di-
agnostic of mind-wandering—but not constitutive of the concept itself—as predicted by
the binary (Keil & Batterman, 1984) and theoretical (Murphy & Medin, 1985) models of
concepts. Further studies are necessary to decide between these interpretations (Hampton,
1995).7
Over the past decade, the science of mind-wandering has seen a whirlwind of progress.
Yet our studies suggest that the folk concept of mind-wandering has been partly lost in
the dust. Our empirical conceptual analysis reveals that laypeople prioritize a feature of
mind-wandering that researchers have neglected until recently: its dynamics. This discon-
nect is troubling. To avoid confusions and effectively communicate with our scientific
colleagues and the public, researchers should take the preexisting meaning of “mind-wan-
dering” into account. By respecting the folk concept, we may even learn distinctions that
advance the science of mind-wandering.
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Notes
1. McVay and Kane (2010) and Watzl (2017) argue that mind-wandering is uninten-
tional because it reflects control failure and akrasia, respectively. Contrarily, our
Studies 1 and 4 show that the folk accept Seli and colleagues’ (2016) thesis that
mind-wandering can be intentional.
2. We used a between-subjects design where each participant rated one vignette to
reduce demand characteristics, which is standard practice in vignette-based experi-
ments. If participants had rated more than one vignette, they may have explicitly
compared them to guess which one the experimenter considers mind-wandering.
3. We call this dimension “dynamic guidance,” because it is based on the so-called
dynamic theory of mind-wandering (Christoff et al., 2016; Irving, 2016).
4. Our analyses focused on the differences in mind-wandering ratings across condi-
tions, rather than mean mind-wandering ratings. We did so because mean ratings
are susceptible to biases such as anchoring effects. Specifically, participants seemed
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to anchor at the midpoint (rather than the low end) of the scale for cases that are
not mind-wandering. For example, we found in Study 4 that on-task, intentional,
and guided thoughts were not rated as significantly lower than the midpoint of 4
(mean rating = 3.56, 95% CI [2.98, 4.15]).
5. For two reasons, we used separate vignettes in Studies 1 through 4 instead of con-
structing one set of vignettes that manipulated all the variables we studied. First,
our design would become unwieldy if we manipulated every variable simultane-
ously (doing so would require 72 conditions). Our vignettes would then likely be
too complicated for ordinary people to understand (simplicity is a central virtue in
vignette-based research). Second, Studies 2, 3, and 4 each placed specialized
demands on our vignettes. Study 2 required that Susan could consider the same
things by thinking about or looking at them. Study 3 required that Susan could
think about the same topic in a goal-directed or ruminative manner. Study 4
required that Susan think about three different topics, which can fall under the
broad umbrella of “her plans for the next few weeks.” We doubt that a single set
of vignettes could satisfy all three desiderata, while being simple and natural
enough to be understood by laypeople.
6. Across both corpora, speakers use almost exclusively “non-agentive” (Irving, 2016)
constructions to refer to mind-wandering. Non-agentive constructions are those
where the grammatical subject of the sentence is a person’s mind (e.g., “Susan’s
mind was wandering”), rather than the person herself (e.g., “Susan was mind-wan-
dering”). Although scientists sometimes use agentive constructions to refer to
mind-wandering (e.g., “subjects mind-wandered in 50% of trials”), this is a neolo-
gism that is almost entirely absent from the English language corpora we reviewed.
In the genre-balanced COCA, there were no non-agentive constructions describing
mind-wandering compared to 249 non-agentive constructions. In the online iWEB,
there were four non-agentive constructions describing mind-wandering compared to
3,443 non-agentive constructions. Furthermore, three of the four agentive construc-
tions in iWEB were from popular science publications. We therefore restricted our
collocate analysis to non-agentive constructions, as doing otherwise would not
change our results. According to Irving (2016), non-agentive constructions are
philosophically interesting because they suggest that we are passive recipients of
mind-wandering: Our mind is what wanders, not us (Irving, 2016). The present lin-
guistic analysis shows that these interesting constructions are pervasive in ordinary
English.
7. Computational linguistic methods can uncover the meaning of the word "mind-
wandering." One might instead treat the family resemblance theory as a scientific
model of mind-wandering. Irving and Glasser (2019) explain how to test that model
using a modified inference to the best explanation. They also sketch how this study
might bear upon that inference.
8. Rather than call Susan’s thoughts “unintentional,” we used the everyday locution
“Susan finds herself thinking about something else.” Philosophers widely agree that
intentional action requires non-observational self-awareness (Anscombe, 1957;
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Peacocke, 2007; Proust, 2013). Given this, we assumed that Susan cannot “find her-
self” intentionally performing an action (since she lacks self-awareness). We test
and confirm this assumption in Appendix S1.
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